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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER G. HENDERSON and \ 
HELEN L. HENDERSON, his wife, J 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, J 
I Case No. 
"
v s
" / 13702 
HARRY R. MEYER and RONALD I 
EUGENE MEYER, I 
Defendants and Respondents. J 
Brief of Defendants-Respondents 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action against the defendants-respond-
ents (hereafter called defendants) by plain tiff-appellant, 
Helen L. Henderson, (hereafter called plaintiff) for dam-
ages for her claimed bodily injuries and by plaintiff-
appellant, Walter G. Henderson, for damages for his 
claimed property damage and which was alleged to have 
resulted from a two-car automobile accident that occurred 
in Bountiful, Utah, on April 22, 1972. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial of the case was heard before the Honorable 
Thornley K. Swan, District Judge, in and for Davis 
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County, Utah, sitting with a jury, and on March 21, 
1974, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action 
in favor of both the defendants and as against both 
plaintiffs, and judgment was duly entered thereon. Sub-
sequently, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Judgment N.O.V., 
or in the Alternative for a New Trial and, after hearing, 
the Honorable District Judge denied said Motions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the jury verdict and 
judgment entered thereon by the Lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants do not agree with the Statement of 
Facts as contained in the appellants' Brief since the facts 
are not fully set forth therein and, to the extent they are, 
they are not stated in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party on this appeal, that being the defendants. 
A full Statement of the Facts will be set out hereafter 
and in the body of the Argument following Point I. 
Because of this, and to avoid repetition, they will not 
be recited here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FACTUAL ISSUES DECIDED BY THE JURY 
IN THIS CASE WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO 
IT AND THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT. 
On the subject matter of liability, the only issues 
which the jury was called upon to decide were whether 
2 
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or not the defendant, Ronald Eugene Meyer, (hereafter 
called Ronald Meyer or Mr. Meyer), was negligent im-
mediately prior to the accident in question and, if so, 
whether his negligence proximately caused the accident 
in question and the injuries and damages claimed by the 
plaintiffs. No claim was made at the trial by the de-
fendants that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent. 
Also, it was conceded at the trial that if Ronald Meyer 
(who was 17 years old at the time of the accident) was 
liable, that so was the other defendant, Harry R. Meyer, 
who was his father. This was so since the latter owned 
the vehicle being driven by his son, Ronald Meyer, and, 
further, since the father had also signed the son's appli-
cation for driver's license. Therefore, and by reason of 
the ownership and the signing, the father was responsible 
for any liability of the son and under 41-2-22 U.C.A., 
1953, and 41-2-10 U.C.A., 1953, respectively. 
Prior to considering the evidence relating to the dis-
puted issues of liability in this case, it is appropriate to 
have in mind certain principles. One of these is the 
well-established rule that since the jury found the issues 
in favor of the defendants, they are entitled to have this 
Court consider all of the evidence, and every inference 
and intendment fairly arising therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the defendants' position. Toomer's Estate v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d 
163; Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Railway Company, 
40 Utah 483,123 P. 97. Another principle which should be 
kept in mind and which is also well-established is that 
the determination of facts under our judicial system is 
left exclusively to the jury and its determination thereon 
3 
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is final excepting only where the evidence is so clear 
that all reasonable minds would find one way and so 
that a verdict contrary thereto must have resulted from 
passion or prejudice, or misconception of the law or the 
evidence, or in arbitrary disregard thereof. Lemmon v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 9 
Utah 2d 195, 341 P.2d 215. 
As is frequently the situation on appeals of this 
kind, the party against whom the jury found seeks 
to have this Court substitute its judgment on the facts 
for the judgment of the jury. Therefore, and rather than 
stating the facts in the light most favorable to the de-
fendants, the plaintiffs in their Brief have often stated 
facts in the light most favorable to them. The following 
is believed to be a fair statement of the material facts 
in this case bearing on the disputed issues of liability 
and in the light most favorable to the defendants. All of 
the facts hereafter stated are from the trial testimony 
of Eonald Meyer (Tr. pp 52-60) and except as otherwise 
indicated by a reference to another portion of the Tran-
script. 
The plaintiff, Helen L. Henderson, brought this 
action for damages for her personal injuries. The 1964 
Mercury automobile which she was driving at the time 
was registered in her husband's name, Walter G. Hen-
derson, he being the other plaintiff. He was not in the 
vehicle at the time of the accident, and his sole claim in 
this lawsuit was for a small amount of property damage 
to the vehicle. 
4 
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The accident in question occurred about noon on 
Saturday, April 22, 1972, and it was a two vehicle acci-
dent with the left front of the Meyer vehicle colliding 
with the right rear of the Henderson vehicle (Tr. p 44). 
Prior to the collision, both vehicles had been northbound 
on 200 West in Bountiful, Utah. That street has one 
lane each way for north and southbound traffic. The 
accident occurred in the block on 200 West between 400 
South Street to the south of where the accident occurred 
and 300 South to the north. Both Fourth and Third South 
are streets traveling east and west and which intersect 
at right angles to 200 West. Although not precisely stated 
in the record, it appears that the point of the collision 
occurred in the northbound lane on 200 West and approxi-
mately mid-way between Fourth and Third South Streets. 
To the west from the point of collision was a Norge 
Town Cleaners into which Mrs. Henderson was intending 
to turn left (Tr. 71). She claimed that she had come up 
and had been stopped waiting for southbound traffic to 
go by before proceeding to make her left turn (Tr. 71). 
Ronald Meyer testified that he thought Mrs. Henderson 
was stopped when he first saw her, although he also 
testified that he thought she had just stopped since her 
rear bumper was still high. 
Mr. Meyer testified that as he was proceeding north 
on 200 West and just as he came through its intersection 
with Fourth South that he first saw a white Rambler 
station wagon to his right which was exiting from a 
drive-in parking lot on to 200 West. At that time, Mr. 
Meyer's speed was about 30 miles per hour and the speed 
5 
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limit on that street at that time was 35 miles per hour. 
When Mr. Meyer saw the Eambler it was traveling from 
east to west at right angles to him. He observed it while 
it traveled a distance of approximately 100 feet and its 
course was such that it was coming west toward where 
he would be passing it northbound on 200 West. Mr. 
Meyer testified that just before he got to where the 
Rambler was exiting on to Second West and from this 
driveway that he honked his horn at the Rambler. That 
car then entered 200 West and with its front door about 
over the gutter on the east side of the street. Mr. Meyer 
testified that he moved to his left to avoid this Rambler 
and "in case he [Rambler] did come out in the road 
after I [Meyer] honked my horn" (Tr. 57). However, 
the Rambler stopped. As Meyer passed in front of the 
Rambler, he looked to his right rear out the rear window 
of the pickup truck he was driving. Meyer didn't know 
how long he looked, but it was only as he passed. When 
he looked back to the road in front of him, the Henderson 
vehicle was too close for him to be able to stop without 
hitting it. Considering the position Mr. Meyer had ob-
served her bumper in and indicating that she had just 
stopped, it may have been that Mrs. Henderson slowed 
and stopped her vehicle during the brief period Mr. 
Meyer's attention was diverted by the Rambler. Immedi-
ately upon seeing her, Meyer applied his brakes and 
swerved to his right. His travel speed had been approxi-
mately 30 miles per hour and the investigating officer 
estimated from Meyer's skid marks that the latter had 
reduced his speed to approximately 15 miles per hour at 
impact (Tr. p 51). The extremely minor damage to the 
6 
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rear of the Henderson vehicle and as shown in the photo-
graph of it admitted into evidence (defendant's Exhibit 1 
in envelope attached to p. 24 of Eec.) may well have 
caused the jury to conclude that Meyer's speed was even 
less than 15 miles per hour upon impact. 
It is clear from the testimony of Meyer that he was 
concerned as he was traveling north that the Rambler 
might enter the street and collide with him and as a 
consequence thereof, his attention to the road ahead of 
him was diverted away for a brief period. Moreover, 
and on this point, Mrs. Henderson herself testified that 
immediately after the accident that she had heard Mr. 
Meyer tell the investigating officer that "he [Meyer] 
thought the car [Rambler] was going to hit him" (Tr. 
74). 
Because of this claimed danger to Mr. Meyer from 
the Rambler, the Court included among its instructions 
to the jury the standard one on "Sudden Peril" that is 
No. 15.4 from JIFU. (Court's Instruction No. 21A Rec. 
p. 59). In essence, that instruction told the jury that if 
they believed that Mr. Meyer had been suddenly con-
fronted with peril arising from either the actual presence 
or the appearance of imminent danger to himself that 
he was not required to use the same judgment and 
prudence as would have been required of him in the 
absence of that peril. No objection or exception was 
made or taken to the giving of this instruction to the 
jury and it is obvious that no legitimate objection could 
have been made since the evidence fairly presented an 
issue involving that instruction. 
7 
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It is evident from the foregoing recitation of facts, 
and as applied to the law, particularly this "sudden peril" 
situation, that the issue of Mr. Meyer's negligence was 
one to be decided by the jury and that the trial court 
would have committed prejudicial error had it directed 
liability in favor of the plaintiffs and as against the 
defendants as a matter of law. The jury may well have 
concluded upon the evidence, and obviously did, that the 
danger posed to Mr. Meyer by this Rambler heading 
toward 200 West and on a collision course with Meyer's 
own vehicle was sufficient to excuse his inattention to 
the road ahead of him and for the brief period of time 
that he was inattentive. Moreover, the jury may well 
have concluded that the period of Meyer's inattention 
was indeed brief and that had his attention not been 
diverted away by the danger posed by the Rambler that 
the accident would not have occurred. The jury may well 
have believed that even with the peril from the Rambler 
that Meyer was able to slow his vehicle from the speed 
it had been traveling and by 15 miles per hour and per-
haps more. He was also able to turn his vehicle to the 
right and so that only approximately one-half of his 
vehicle collided with approximately one-half of the rear 
of the other vehicle. On this evidence, the jury may well 
have concluded that had Meyer not been diverted by 
the Rambler for perhaps one or two seconds that he would 
have been able to have stopped or turned and so as to 
have completely avoided the accident in question. In 
other words, the jury on the Trial Court's instructions 
may have concluded that the accident resulted from the 
sudden peril of the Rambler rather than from any negli-
gence on Mr. Meyer's part. 
8 
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Considering all of the evidence and the inferences 
that may have been reasonably drawn therefrom by the 
jury, it is apparent that this was a case where the jury 
was justified in excusing Mr. Meyer's rear-ending of the 
Henderson vehicle and because of the "sudden peril'* 
that the jury believed resulted from the presence of the 
Rambler. Although they do not involve the "sudden peril" 
doctrine, it is respectfully submitted that this Court has 
held that a jury question exists on an issue of liability 
in an automobile accident case and in at least two cases 
involving vehicular collisions where any issue of liability 
was more doubtful than it is in this instant case. Fair-
bourn v. Lloyd, 21 Utah 2d 62, 440 P.2d 257; Gibbons v. 
Orem City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 184, 493 R2d 1280. 
In reviewing the record of this case relating to the 
issues of liability, the members of this Court may well 
conclude that had they sat on the jury that they would 
not have reached the verdict the jury did. Counsel for 
the defendants would be less than candid if he did not 
admit that the jury verdict came as a surprise to him 
and that a contrary verdict had been expected. It was 
apparent that counsel for the plaintiff was even more1 
surprised in this regard and this expectation possibly 
explains his failure to even request of the Court prior 
to the submission of the case to the jury that the issues 
of liability be withdrawn from the jury and as will be 
discussed more fully under Point I I hereafter. Never-
theless, the test is not what is expected or probable, 
but it is rather whether there was any competent evi-
dence to support the verdict that was returned. In the 
instant case, a unanimous jury found, in effect, that 
9 
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Ronald Meyer was not negligent. Obviously, the Trial 
Judge believed that the jury was within its prerrogative 
in reaching that verdict or he would not have submitted 
the issues to them, nor would he have allowed the verdict 
to stand thereafter and in the face of the post-trial mo-
tions that were made by the attorney for the plaintiffs. 
On this subject matter of the proper function of the 
court and jury and under our judicial system, this 
Court had the following to say in the case of Stickle v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 122 Utah 477, 251 P.2d 
867, at 871: 
"Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arrogate 
to themselves arbitrary and dangerous powers by 
presuming to determine questions of fact which 
litigants have a right to have passed upon by 
juries. Part of the merits of the jury system is 
its safeguarding against such arbitrary power in 
the courts. To the great credit of the courts of 
this country, they have been extremely reluctant 
to infringe upon this right, and by leaving it 
unimpaired have kept the administration of jus-
tice close to the people. Of course, the rights of 
litigants should not be surrendered to the arbi-
trary will of juries without regard to whether 
there is a violation of legal rights as a basis for 
recovery. The court does have a duty and a re-
sponsibility of supervisory control over the action 
of juries which is just as essential to the proper 
administration of justice as the function of the 
jury itself. Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of 
the vital importance of the privilege of trial by 
jury in our system of justice and deem it our 
duty to zealously protect and preserve it." 
10 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MAKE ANY MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF 
THE EVIDENCE AND THEY ARE NOW FORE-
CLOSED THEREBY FROM CLAIMING THAT THE 
ISSUES OF LIABILITY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that a party may move for a directed verdict in 
his favor and at the close of the evidence. That rule 
further provides that "a motion for a directed verdict 
shall state the specific ground[s] therefor." Rule 50(b) 
U.R.C.P. makes clear that a Motion for a Judgment 
N.O.V. is only appropriate where "a motion for a directed 
verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or 
for any reason is not granted" Rule 50(a) and (b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and upon which 
our Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were based, are iden-
tical and as they relate to the language of those rules at 
issue in the instant case. 
As argued under Point I above, defendants contend 
that the evidence was ample to justify the Trial Court in 
submitting the issues of liability in this case to the jury. 
However, and even if this Court were to reject the de-
fendants' argument under Point I above and were to 
hold as a matter of law that all reasonable minds must 
have concluded on the evidence that Ronald Meyer was 
negligent and that his negligence proximately caused the 
accident, still, the plaintiffs are now foreclosed to make 
that argument. This is so because the plaintiffs failed 
to properly request of the Trial Court and at the close 
of the evidence, a directed verdict in their favor and as 
against the defendants. Not having made that motion or 
11 
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request anywhere in the record either orally or in writ-
ing, the plaintiffs cannot now complain that the issues of 
the defendants' liability w^ere improperly submitted to 
the jury and because of insufficient evidence. Moreover, 
it is very clear from the law that will be hereafter cited 
that there is no basis under which the Court could have 
granted a Judgment N.O.V. and where a request or mo-
tion for a directed verdict was not made at the close of 
the evidence and prior to the time the jury retired to 
deliberate. 
In order to have the complete record of all proceed-
ings in the trial of this case before this Court on appeal, 
the defendants designated as record on this appeal not 
only the testimony of all witnesses at the trial, but also 
"the record of all discussions among counsel, among 
counsel and the Court, and every other portion of the 
record stenographically transcribed * * *" (Rec. 103). 
This was done to conclusively demonstrate to this Court 
that at no time upon the record did plaintiffs or their 
counsel in writing or orally request of the Trial Court 
that it direct a verdict in their favor and in the manner 
clearly required by Eule 50(b) U.R.C.P. 
I t is further true that plaintiff's attorney excepted $o the 
course of the trial (not "at the close of the evidence" 
as required by Eule 50) did submit his request that the 
jury be instructed as follows: 
"You are instructed to return a verdict in favor 
of plaintiff, Helen L. Henderson, and against 
defendants on the issue of liability." (Rec. 26) 
I t is further true that plaintiffs' attorney excepted to the 
Trial Court's failure to give that instruction (without 
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stating any reasons for so excepting) and after the jury 
had retired to deliberate (Tr. 196). Of course, following 
the trial and within the time permitted by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs did move the Court for 
a Judgment N.O.V. or in the alternative for a new trial 
and it was then and only then that the plaintiffs ever 
contended that the issues of the defendants' liability 
should not have been submitted to the jury and on the 
grounds that all reasonable minds would have to have 
concluded that Ronald Meyer was guilty of negligence as 
a matter of law and that his negligence proximately 
caused the injuries and damages to the plaintiffs. In 
other words, the plaintiffs waited until about one week 
after the jury had reached their decision on liability 
before it was ever contended to the Trial Court that this 
issue of liability wasn't properly before the jury. As will 
appear from the cases referred to hereafter, it would be 
improper under these circumstances to allow the plain-
tiffs to now contend that the issues of liability were 
improperly submitted to the jury. 
The only possible basis that the plaintiffs have for 
contending that they made a Motion for a Directed 
Verdict in the Trial Court would have to be predicated 
upon their requested Instruction No. 1 which is quoted 
above. It is interesting to note that the only request 
contained in that requested instruction relates to plain-
tiff, Helen L. Henderson, and no request is made for the 
other plaintiff, Walter G. Henderson. Although his claim 
is relatively minor and involves only a small amount of 
property damage, it is apparent that no possible basis 
exists for contending that any motion for a directed ver-
dict was made in his favor and as against the defendants 
13 
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and even if this Court were to hold that requested In-
struction No. 1 qualifies as a Motion for a Directed 
Verdict under Rule 50 IJ.R.C.P. 
I t is also significant to note that not only did the 
plaintiffs in this case fail to properly request that the 
issues of the defendants' liability be taken from the jury, 
but they even submitted instructions to the Trial Court 
concerning their theories as to how the issues of Ronald 
Meyer's negligence should be presented to the jury. 
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 2 defines negligence 
and was given by the Court (Rec. 27). Plaintiffs' re-
quested Instruction No. 5 is a detailed statement of the 
manner in which the plaintiffs believed Ronald Meyer 
to have been negligent and it was also given in substance 
by the Court (Rec. 29). I t is submitted that these re-
quested instructions compound the problem that exists 
by reason of the plaintiffs' failure to properly move for 
a directed verdict. That is, not only wTas no such motion 
made, but they then requested that the Trial Court give 
instructions on the very subject matter they are now 
contending should have been withdrawn from the jury. 
Under these circumstances, it is respectfully submitted 
that it would be a poor precedent indeed to charge the 
Trial Court with prejudicial error in having submitted 
the issue of negligence to the jury. 
Counsel for defendants has not been able to find any 
Utah cases that have interpreted Rule 50 and on the 
point at issue. However, there are a number of Federal 
cases that have ruled upon this issue and which are 
believed to be squarely in point and considering that the 
14 
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Utah and Federal rules are identical on this subject 
matter. Some of these cases are Guglielmo v. Scotti & 
Sons, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 413 (1973); Brandon v. Yale and 
Towne Manufacturing Company, 220 F. Supp. 855 (1963), 
Affirmed per curiam at 342 F.2d 519 (1965); Massaro v. 
United States Lines Company, 307 F.2d 299, (1962); 
Eisenberg v. Smith, 263 F.2d 827 (1959), Cert. Denied 
360 U.S. 918. 
In Guglielmo v. Scotti & Sons, Inc., Supra, the Court 
held that Federal Rule 50(a) required a party to move 
for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence 
in order to preserve its right to move for a judgment 
N.O.V. after the verdict. In that case, the fact that one 
of the parties chose not to move for a directed verdict 
at the close of all of the evidence foreclosed any consid-
eration of its later request for a judgment N.O.V. Also, 
in that case, the party appealing had made some request 
for specific charges to the jury which it claimed had 
constituted a motion for a directed verdict. The Court 
held otherwise and found that the specificity requirement 
of Rule 50(a) had not been met. 
In Brandon v. Yale and Towne Manufacturing Com-
pany, Supra, one of the parties had requested an instruc-
tion to the jury which was very similar to the plaintiffs' 
requested Instruction No. 1 in the instant case. The 
requested instruction from the Brandon case was as 
follows: 
"Under all the evidence in this case, your verdict 
must be in favor of the defendant." 
15 
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The party who had requested that instruction in the 
Brandon case contended that this request constituted a 
motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50 F.R.C.P. 
The Court held otherwise and stated: 
< "Such a request is unspecific in its terms and 
does not meet the requirements of Rule 50(a) 
* # #» 
This same kind of situation was involved in the case 
of Massaro v. United States Lines Company, Supra. In 
the Massaro case, the Court had the following to say on 
this subject matter: 
"United sought, as we have said, judgment n.o.v. 
against Northern Metal. But United made no 
motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a). 
We therefore do not have the question of the suf-
ficiency of the evidence before us. [Citations omit-
ted] A motion for a directed verdict is a prerequi-
site of a motion for judgment n.o.v. [Citations 
omitted] 
"We cannot deem United's request for charge 
No. 9 as affording it aid in its predicament. Re-
quest for charge No. 9 was as follows: 'Under all 
of the evidence, your verdict in the third-party 
action must be in favor of the third-party plain-
tiff. Such a request does not meet the require-
ments of Rule 50(a) for the request in its terms 
is unspecific and was made at the beginning of 
the trial. It was waived when it was not renewed 
at the close of the evidence." 
To the same effect is certain language from Eisen-
berg v. Smith, Supra, which is as follows: 
"The Government next says that the plaintiffs 
are not entitled to consideration of their motion 
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for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because 
they made no motion for a directed verdict at the 
conclusion of the presentation of all the evidence. 
F.E. Civ. P. 50(b), 28 U.S.-C., provides that <* * * 
a party who has moved for a directed verdict may 
move to have the verdict and any judgment en-
tered thereon set aside and to have judgment 
entered in accordance with his motion for a di-
rected verdict * * #? Rule 50(a) states that 'A mo-
tion for a directed verdict shall state the specific 
grounds therefor/ These plaintiffs, in the first 
of their requested points for charge to the jury, 
did ask for the following: 'On the basis of the 
evidence and the applicable law, you are directed 
to find a verdict for the Plaintiffs.' 
"This request, thrown in along with a considerable 
list of points for charge, is not, we think a com-
pliance with the rule as stated in Section 50(a) 
and quoted above. It certainly gives the trial 
judge no hint of what the position of the party 
making the motion is, except that he wants the 
lawsuit decided in his favor. The purpose of the 
rule requiring the stating of grounds is, of course, 
to let the trial judge and opposing counsel see 
what the problem is so that the decision will be 
the best that can be had. [Citations omitted]" 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
I t is evident that the purpose for requiring compli-
ance with Rule 50 in Utah, as well as in the Federal 
system, is as stated above in the language from the 
Eisenherg case. How can the trial judge possibly be 
expected to take the case from the jury on the issues 
of Meyer's negligence and proximate cause where he is 
not even requested to do so prior to the jury's retiring 
to deliberate and where, in fact, he has been requested 
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to instruct the jury on theories of negligence propounded 
by the very parties who are now contending that those 
issues should never have been submitted to the jury. 
Although not squarely in point to the instant case 
since the procedural questions raised there were some-
what different than here, it is nevertheless believed that 
dicta in the Utah case of Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric 
Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393, is helpful to 
the resolution of this case. In the Brigham case, this 
Court stated at 24 Utah 2d 294: 
"An appellate court ought not to do that which 
was not requested of the trial court. The recent 
case of Price v. Sinnott, 460 P.2d 837, 841 (Nev. 
1969), states the law: 
'* •* * I t is solidly established that when 
there is no request for a directed verdict, the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain the verdict is not reviewable. [Cita-
tions omitted] A party may not gamble on 
the jury's verdict and then later, when dis-
pleased with the verdict, challenge the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support it.' 
"In the case of Christensen v. Stucklik, 91 Idaho 
504, 427 P.2d 278, 280, 281 (1967), the court said: 
'The failure of the appellant here to present 
to the trial court a motion for directed verdict 
not only foreclosed the trial court from con-
sideration of his motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, but under decisions 
interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, such failure precludes the appellate 
court from reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the verdict. * * *' " 
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CONCLUSION 
The issues of liability were properly submitted to 
the jury under appropriate instructions from the Court 
and there was sufficient evidence to justify its verdict 
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. 
Even if there had not been sufficient evidence, the plain-
tiffs are in no position to complain at this point and 
inasmuch as no Motion for a Directed Verdict at the close 
of the evidence was made by the plaintiffs and pursuant 
to Rule 50 U.R.C.P. 
The judgment based upon the jury verdict should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
By 
David K. Winder 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendamts-
Bespondents 
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